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Executive Summary 
Strategic dynamics in the Middle East are in flux. While conflict and terrorism have 
eroded stability across the region, a cold war between Iran and its Sunni Arab 
neighbors has worsened. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in particular fear 
their Iranian neighbor’s growing influence in the region. They see their security and 
Sunni dominion in general threatened by the ascendency of Iran and its Shiite allies. 
Added to this is the specter of a nuclear-armed Iran, which many in the Gulf feel will 
one day become a reality.  
The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have not lessened this anxiety. 
Instead, Gulf Arab states believe a deal rewards Iran for bad behavior and puts it on 
the road to an eventual nuclear weapons capability. Gulf states continue to view the 
United States as their primary defense partner and as the guarantor of security in the 
Persian Gulf. However, they question—given current U.S. policies and the pivot to 
Asia—whether defense ties with the United States will remain sufficient to deter Iran 
and counter its regional ambitions. That uncertainty has implications for the future 
of stability and nuclear proliferation in the region.  
If nuclear proliferation in the Gulf is to be prevented, the United States will need to 
have a clear view of its Gulf allies’ security concerns. To that end, CNA organized a 
Track 1.5 forum to encourage dialogue between the United States and its Gulf allies 
on these issues and to explore the broader questions of deterrence and assurance. 
The closed-door event brought together officials, scholars, and experts from the 
United States, the five GCC states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, 
Kuwait, and Bahrain), Jordan, and Turkey to engage in an unofficial and not-for-
attribution discussion on strategic issues. The event was divided into three panels, 
each followed by group discussion. Panel topics included nuclear weapons and 
strategic deterrence in the Gulf; regional perceptions of U.S. policies; and the 
potential for future nuclear proliferation in the region. Three speakers (one from the 
United States and two from the region) offered presentations for each panel.  
What the event made clear is that even though the Gulf Arab states worry about Iran 
and are dissatisfied with U.S. policies, they remain reliant on U.S.-provided 
deterrence. However, their trust in the United States and in its commitment to deter 
Iran is waning. There is therefore a tension between what the Gulf states want the 
United States’ role in the region to be and what they believe it is or will be in the 
future. The following are among several key takeaways from the event: 
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 Increasing mistrust is fundamentally changing GCC perceptions of the United 
States. A nuclear deal with Iran could worsen U.S.-GCC relations. Gulf Arab 
states might seek “parity” with Iran after a deal.  
 Nuclear proliferation, though a potential component of reaching parity with 
Iran, might still be unlikely among GCC states.  
 Saudi Arabia remains the “wild card” for nuclear proliferation in the Gulf.  
 No foreign power can replace the United States as the security guarantor of 
the Persian Gulf, and GCC states know this.  
 GCC states desire closer relations with the United States, access to more 
advanced ballistic missile technology, and the ability to develop indigenous 
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The Middle East is a region in crisis. Violent extremism, trans-state insurgencies, and 
warfare have plagued the region and eroded many of the structures that kept 
instability at bay. Helping fuel this instability is the tense rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. The decades-long antipathy between these two states, and their 
competition for legitimacy as leaders of the Muslim world, has transformed into a 
sectarian cold war. This has divided the Middle East along sectarian and political 
lines. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies see Iran as an 
aspiring regional hegemon that exploits relationships with client organizations to 
spread its influence and project power beyond its borders. Iran’s close ties to Shiite 
organizations (such as Lebanese Hezbollah and numerous militias in Iraq) and 
support for the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria and the Zaydi-
Shia Ansarallah organization (also known as the Houthis) in Yemen, have made Iran’s 
activities in the Middle East appear starkly sectarian to the Sunni monarchies of the 
GCC. Gulf Arab states fear that Iran is exploiting regional conflicts to create a mostly 
contiguous, Shiite-dominated, and pro-Iranian zone of influence that spreads west to 
the Mediterranean and south to Yemen. They further fear that Iran desires to 
undermine the political authority of the Sunni monarchies through coercive 
diplomacy, proxies, and other forms of subterfuge. 
That fear is underpinned by a more troubling prospect for GCC states: the specter of 
a nuclear-armed Iran. While the GCC and other regional states (especially Jordan and 
Turkey) wrestle with the immediate challenges of warfare and instability, they worry 
that a nuclear-armed Iran would have almost unchecked leverage in regional matters. 
Above all, as they see it, a nuclear weapons capability would insulate Iran from 
outside conventional military threats (especially from the United States), which up 
until recently was the only thing that mitigated Iran’s ambitions. Without parallel 
capabilities, Gulf Arab states are trepidatious that they will lack the wherewithal to 
defend their equities from Iranian coercion and regional influence. 
Instead of allaying these concerns, the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 
P5+1 have increased this anxiety. Gulf Arab states do not think that the rumored 
parameters of a nuclear deal with Iran go far enough. They believe the deal will leave 
Iran with much of its nuclear enrichment program intact, and they see any limits on 
that program to be insufficient. The prevailing view in Gulf Arab capitals is that with 





not an outright nuclear weapons capability) at some point in the future. They see this 
as their number one strategic threat. 
This is a potential problem for the United States. As the closest Western ally to the 
GCC and the security guarantor of the Persian Gulf, the United States is considered to 
be the only viable counterweight to Iran’s ambitions. With the pivot to Asia and a 
potential nuclear deal with Iran, Gulf Arab states are uncertain about America’s 
commitment to their security. That general sense of insecurity is what might propel 
some Gulf Arab states toward pursuing their own nuclear enrichment and/or 
weapons programs in response to the Iranians. Preventing nuclear proliferation in 
the Middle East is of course a major motivation for the P5+1’s proposed deal with 
Iran. However, because Gulf Arab states largely do not view a deal that would allow 
Iran to retain any enrichment capability as sufficient, it is possible that a deal will not 
adequately address the GCC’s concerns. 
In order to assuage GCC fears and prevent nuclear proliferation, the United States 
needs to have a clear view of its Gulf allies’ security concerns and their perspectives 
on potential options to address those concerns. The GCC will continue to consider 
the United States the backbone of their deterrence efforts. However, as dynamics in 
the region change, so too might what is required to provide assurance. Providing 
adequate assurance to GCC states will be the foundation for any effort to prevent 
nuclear proliferation in the region. Although the GCC states might harbor unrealistic 
expectations of their defense ties to the United States, there might be options 
acceptable to both Washington and its Gulf allies that could mitigate their concerns 
and obviate any potential reactionary nuclear proliferation.   
CNA organized a Track 1.5 forum to encourage dialogue between the United States 
and its Gulf allies on these issues. The event brought together officials, scholars, and 
experts from the United States, the six GCC states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain), Jordan, and Turkey to engage in an 
unofficial and not-for-attribution discussion on strategic issues. The closed-door 
setting encouraged frank conversation among the participants, so that regional 
perceptions and opinions could be explored unhindered by public considerations. 
The dialogue took place on 6 May 2015 in Istanbul, Turkey. Holding the event outside 
the Gulf allowed the GCC participants more comfort to speak their minds—especially 
on topics where their views conflicted with the official policies of their governments. 
The location also provided an opportunity to incorporate Turkish as well as 
Jordanian representatives to participate, which enabled the discussion to 
occasionally move beyond GCC perspectives, while not diluting the overall goal of the 
event. 
Discussion among participants at the event was blunt and uninhibited. Regional 
participants spoke directly to one another in both agreement and disagreement, and 





about criticizing U.S. policy or blaming Washington for problems in the region. Many 
seemed to see the event as an opportunity to convey criticism for U.S. policy and 
actions directly to Americans of influence. During certain exchanges, regional 
participants spoke to their American counterparts almost as if the latter represented 
the current U.S. administration. It was made clear—and regional participants fully 
understood—however, that the U.S. attendees (like the regional delegates) did not 
represent any official entity and were speaking in a purely personal capacity. 
Nonetheless, many of the views expressed by the regional attendees should be 
considered with that dynamic in mind. 
Below is a detailed review of the event. It is divided into four main parts. The first 
three sections correspond to the event’s three panels and the discussion that 
followed each panel. The fourth part concludes the report and offers key takeaways 
from the event. Because attendees of the dialogue participated under the explicit 
promise that their comments would be for nonattribution, we do not identify anyone 
in the report. Instead, in order to give the reader some context for the comments of 
each participant, we refer to them vaguely by their professional background and 





Panel 1: Nuclear Weapons and 
Strategic Deterrence in the Persian 
Gulf 
The first panel was designed to explore the sensitive question of potential nuclear 
proliferation in the GCC states and the Middle East more broadly. Panelists were 
asked to respond to the question from their own perspective and comment on what 
the potential for nuclear proliferation was in the region, Their responses should take 
into account both the development of civilian nuclear enrichment programs (beyond 
what already exists) in regional states outside of Iran and the possible development 
of nuclear weapons programs (either via breakout capabilities, outright production 
and tests, or through the procurement of nuclear weapons from a third party such as 
Pakistan). Regional participants, sometimes prompted by comments from their 
American counterparts, spoke to the broader questions directly, while generally 
avoiding specifics.  
As was illustrated during the entire event, regional participants did not view the 
nuclear issue in a vacuum. The issue was therefore difficult for them to speak about 
in a detailed fashion. Regional participants tended to view the issue of nuclear 
proliferation as a potential response to a host of other political and strategic 
considerations, grievances, and anxieties. At the top of the list was the enduring 
threat of Iran and the fear that a nuclear deal between Iran and the West will leave 
Iran stronger and put it on the path to developing a nuclear weapons capability. 
The panel’s first speaker was a former U.S. defense official and senior executive at a 
defense-focused think tank in the Washington D.C. area. The participant spoke on 
the prospects for deterrence in the region, alternative options for strengthening GCC 
deterrence efforts vis-à-vis Iran, and the implications of nuclear weapons 
proliferation in the Middle East. These comments began with an underlining point: 
nuclear weapons are inherently disruptive and “intertwined with security 
dimensions.” This point was followed with another regarding proliferation, which the 
speaker counseled has not historically “emerged from one state.” “This has 
implications for Iran,” he continued, as Iran might not ever choose to develop a 
nuclear weapon or share its hard-earned knowhow with proxies. Instead Iran would 
likely gain a deterrent effect from the unclear status of its program, effectively 





nuclear weapons barrier and instead remain content with a potential future breakout 
capability.  
The speaker then turned to deterrence options for the GCC—options for the present 
and alternatives for the future. The speaker stressed that the United States remained 
the best guarantor of Gulf security and the most capable defense partner for the 
GCC. He discussed possible alternative defense partners for the GCC, such as China 
or India. Neither in his estimation—for a number of reasons, including limited 
capabilities, capacities, and political will—could (or would) provide the GCC with the 
same security assurances as the United States. The only potential alternative is 
France, which has important ties to the region, a strong military, a strong 
commitment to foreign military sales and assistance, and perhaps the political will to 
forge such a partnership with the GCC. Although regional participants seemed to 
agree with this assessment, none seemed to take the thought very seriously. There 
was no follow-on discussion exploring France as an alternative to the United States, 
nor was a possible future French-GCC defense pact discussed.  
The speaker concluded his comments with a note on the problems of proliferation. 
Warning against a GCC decision to match or counter Iran’s capability with a nuclear 
program (or programs) of its own, the speaker highlighted escalation dynamics as 
being the most serious implication of nuclear proliferation. He used the example of 
Pakistan and India to argue that “escalation dynamics could grow horizontally,” 
making the prospect of nuclear war an inherent danger in any military standoff or 
conflict. 
The second panelist, an academic and executive at a strategic issues-focused 
research organization in Jordan, argued against the need for nuclear proliferation in 
Arab states. The panelist began with a central assertion: “Iran’s nuclear file [has been] 
addressed,” the implication being that an expected nuclear deal would adequately 
limit Iranian enrichment production, introduce increased monitoring and other 
safeguards, and prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. In other 
words, the speaker did not view Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to the Middle East 
and considered the issue to likely be resolved through negotiations and a deal. He 
followed up this comment by stating that Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile had 
likewise been dealt with.  
From the speaker’s perspective, the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in 
the Middle East was therefore low. For this reason, he considered it unwise and 
counterproductive for Arab states to pursue nuclear enrichment programs in 
response to the Iranian program or in response to a nuclear deal. He used the 
example of Israel to argue that possessing nuclear weapons does not deter outside 
attacks, as evinced over the decades by attacks on Israel by Arab states and nonstate 
actors (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.). A tacit nuclear weapons capability 
likely will not buffer Iran from outside attacks, nor serve as an insurmountable 





would not completely safeguard Gulf Arab states or prevent Iran from meddling or 
sponsoring clients in their countries either. This is because, the speaker argued, 
“nuclear deterrence makes no sense in a geographically confined region” such as the 
Middle East. The region is simply too small for the use of nuclear weapons to be 
strategically viable.  Any state that used a nuclear weapon against a regional foe 
would incur hazardous blowback and likely disastrous political implications. The 
threat of nuclear weapons usage in the region will correspondingly lack credibility.  
The final panelist was a former senior military officer from the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). He began his comments by exploring the idea that isolation and sanctions 
encourage rather than inhibit nuclear weapons interest and development. North 
Korea and, to a much lesser extent, South Africa were held up as the primary 
examples of the failure of sanctions and isolation policies. Such a relationship 
between sanctions and nuclear development is also exemplified by Iran, whom the 
speaker argued was spurred by sanctions to “vastly increase its numbers [of] 
centrifuges.” Far from being discouraged by sanctions, sanctions helped transform 
Iran into “a nuclear threshold state.” 
The speaker then turned to the topic of U.S.-GCC defense relations, beginning with 
the thesis: “extended deterrence is not practical.” The reasons for this were many, 
according to the former senior military official, but the main reason was that “the 
Pentagon puts too many limits on assistance.” From the speaker’s experience, dealing 
with American counterparts was cumbersome, difficult, and included wading 
through too much bureaucracy and red tape to be efficient. He offered the example 
of one program that included giving the UAE access to a satellite early warning 
system. While this form of assistance was welcome in theory, it was untenable in 
practice because the UAE military had to give advance notice and seek the Pentagon’s 
approval each time it wanted to use the system. In the theater of conflict, or in a 
surprise attack, such convoluted protocols would be inefficient and 
counterproductive. 
For the speaker, the indignities of such needlessly complex agreements evinced a 
fundamental and more problematic truth: Washington simply did not trust its Arab 
“partners.” The speaker used hand quotes in saying “partners” to indicate that 
America’s Arab allies did not feel that they were seen as equal partners with the 
United States—a theme that was brought up continually by many participants during 
the day.  
A related point of grievance expressed by the former senior military officer was that 
Washington’s policies in the Middle East were tantamount to a double standard. That 
is, in his view Iran was allowed to make gains despite its hostile behavior, whereas 
the Arabs were prevented from advancing their military and defense capabilities even 
though they have remained faithful allies of the United States. He saw this 
particularly in the realm of ballistic missile defense (BMD), where Arab states are 





In his words, the U.S. policy toward the Middle East could be summed up by the 
phrase “halal for everyone, haram for us [GCC/Arab states].” That is, what is 
allowable (halal) to others (such as indigenous BMD) is impermissible (haram) to 
states such as the UAE. The speaker followed this point with a rhetorical question: 
“Would the U.S. or E.U. allow the GCC the same capabilities as Iran has now?” He 
continued, “Reaching parity [with Iran] is essential deterrence.” Above all, this 
point—that to effectively deter Iran, GCC states required parity with their neighbor—
was at the core of the former senior officer’s presentation and his comments 
expressed throughout the remainder of the day. The speaker concluded by stating, 
“There is no belief in the GCC that the U.S. offers effective strategic deterrence.” This 
conviction will persist, he continued, until Washington’s attitude shifts from one of 
providing “strategic deterrence” to its Gulf partners to one of building deterrence 
with its “strategic partners.” 
Panel 1: Discussion 
A brief discussion period followed the first panel’s presentations. To give it shape, 
we asked each participant to respond to a single question: how would an Iranian 
nuclear deal impact U.S.-GCC deterrence relations? This question spurred some frank 
responses by the regional panelists. Speaker three, the retired Emirati military 
official, commented bluntly that he was “not optimistic” about the future of U.S.-GCC 
defense relations after a deal. He argued that there was a fundamental lack of 
respect and a clear inequity in how the United States treated its Gulf partners. 
Washington “informs but doesn’t consult” the GCC on its Middle East policies. 
Washington further does not “take the advice” of the GCC states, nor does it “listen” 
to their counsel on regional issues. He suggested that the only way to create an 
effective deterrent to Iran in the Gulf would be to build that deterrence through the 
development of indigenous capabilities in GCC states. 
The second panelist, from Jordan, had a more hopeful response. He was encouraged 
by President Obama’s 2011 Cairo speech, saying that the speech was “important” and 
expressed “lots of hope” for U.S. policy in the Middle East. He further contended that 
the “central challenge” for the region was not Iran, which he considered to be dealt 
with assuming a nuclear deal is made with the P5+1. Rather, he suggested, it was the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was the root of the region’s troubles. Solving that 
would gradually solve the problem of extremism, he argued, because Palestine was 
the main motivating factor pushing Arab youth toward extremism. This was not a 
popular comment among the regional participants, with many shaking their heads in 
disagreement. That visual—a room of former senior Gulf officials, academics, and 
defense experts in obvious disagreement—illustrated the Jordanian’s final comment 





a clash of identity—perhaps more accurately rendered as a lack of focus—within 
Arab states that has led to the current morass of discord and instability.   
The former Pentagon official who served as the first speaker of the day offered a few 
comments on U.S. policy. He began by explaining his view on the Asia rebalance. The 
pivot, he explained, was important to the United States because the “economic 
gravity” of the Asia-Pacific region was too great for Washington to ignore. He 
proposed that the United States cannot choose between these regions and would 
remain a part of the Middle East for the foreseeable future. However, he argued, that 
does not mean that the United States can limit hegemonic powers such as Iran or 
China in either region. Something that, he implied, the GCC states should come to 
accept.  
As an alternative, the speaker presented some ideas on how the United States could 
support deterrence measures in the GCC—all of which received enthusiastic support 
from regional participants. First, Washington should begin to view precision-guided 
munitions as a way to buffer deterrence and avoid the proliferation of WMD in the 
Gulf. The speaker highlighted the value of precision-guided missiles in developing 
effective air and sea access denial—a capability that would strengthen GCC security 
vis-à-vis threats posed by Iran. On this point, the former Pentagon official suggested 
that Washington should move beyond the confines of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty (which banned ballistic missile delivery systems ranging 
from 500-5000 km) as a step that could be taken to help incorporate ballistic missile 
defense systems into the security architecture of Gulf states. Finally, the United 
States should consider forward basing additional forces in the region to help 
deterrence efforts. While several regional participants nodded in agreement to that 
last point, the majority showed much more enthusiastic support for the speaker’s 
suggestion of bringing precision-guided missiles to the Gulf and rethinking the INF 
treaty ban on delivery systems. 
Comments from the participants followed. A senior Qatari academic and researcher 
at a Doha-based policy organization reiterated the point (made earlier by the former 
Emirati defense official) that the U.S. supports a double standard in the region: “Iran 
can have, Arabs cannot,” he said. He emphasized that the U.S. and Arab states should 
have good relations and that Washington should know that “the Arabs are its 
friends.” A senior Emirati political scientist agreed with this sentiment, arguing that 
the United States does not treat its Arab “partners” as partners. A prime example—
and common grievance among the participants—was that the GCC had not been 
asked to be a part of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran. He more broadly blamed the 
United States for the major problems currently affecting the region. 
A Kuwaiti academic and a senior Saudi journalist both pushed back on this point and 
argued that the region’s problems were rooted in internal pathologies, not external 
policy matters.  The Kuwaiti suggested that Arab states put too much stock in their 





their problems. As he put it, “D.C. is treated as Mecca instead of the real Mecca.” The 
senior Saudi journalist argued that the region’s issues were primarily social and 
cultural, not strategic. “The Arab world will have the same problems even without 
Iran,” he said. Because of this, the solution to current dilemmas is not something that 
Washington can provide, rather “an indigenous [Arab] answer is required.” 
At this point, a senior Pentagon official who had recently transitioned out from his 
government post (and who would serve on the next panel), posed a question to the 
regional participants: Could the “proliferation of nuclear threshold states increase 
stability” in the region? A Kuwaiti academic responded that Arab states want to 
establish bi-polarity in the region (such as in the Cold War) as a way to avoid a major 
inter-state regional war. He said this “balance of terror” was essential to deterring 
Iran from using its nuclear status as leverage for coercive actions. He argued that, 
because Arabs want the same leverage as Iran possesses, “nuclear parity is 
inevitable.” A WMD-free Middle East is a “pipe dream,” he concluded, and not a policy 





Panel 2: Regional Perceptions of U.S. 
Policy and the Impact on Strategic 
Deterrence Thinking 
Perceptions of U.S. policy—its failures, trends, and intentions—are inseparable from 
strategic thinking and decision making in the Gulf. Regional strategic thought is 
largely derived as a reaction to current U.S. policy or in anticipation of what U.S. 
policy might be. For this reason, the second panel was designed to give regional 
participants an opportunity to comment on U.S. regional policies. Their comments 
serve as an example of how U.S. Middle East policy is viewed in the region. Because of 
the importance of U.S. relations to GCC states, how these states understand U.S. 
policy is a key factor in their own determinations on defense and strategic issues. It 
is the context for decision making in the Gulf and is therefore vital for U.S. officials 
to consider. Although the speakers on this panel addressed the issue, much of the 
commentary moved beyond views on U.S. policy. This is likely due to the robust 
discussion following the first panel in which many participants took the opportunity 
to comment on and express frustration with U.S. Middle East policy. What filled the 
void was a broader discussion on Syria and other regional matters.     
The first speaker—a former U.S. Department of Defense official who had recently left 
his position at the Pentagon and was speaking in a personal capacity—began his 
comments with a statement that resonated deeply with regional participants. He 
acknowledged that the main issue after a nuclear deal will be Iran’s role in the region. 
He assured the room that the United States was thinking a lot about this issue and 
would not walk away from its regional allies. He pointed to standing U.S. 
commitments to the region as a proof that Washington valued its partnerships with 
Middle East states. The United States “already has robust defense systems and forces 
in the Gulf,” he said. Between that and other defense commitments, the former 
Pentagon official suggested that Washington saw itself as doing a lot already “to help 
provide deterrence and assure allies.” However, he suggested, the Pentagon needs to 
form closer relations with its GCC counterparts. Closer contacts between U.S. and 
regional defense officials could do a lot to bridge the divide, help clarify 
misunderstandings, and strengthen defense relations. Greater U.S. support will not 
solve the region’s problems, he stated. The GCC needs to take more “ownership” on 






The next speaker was a Kuwaiti political scientist. The thrust of his talk was that the 
United States destabilized the Middle East by allowing the ascendancy of Iraqi Shiites 
in post-Saddam Iraq. The fall of Saddam “ended the [regional] balance of power with 
Iran.” All problems in the region stem from this, he argued. He then quoted several 
op-eds written by former Bush administration officials criticizing the Obama 
administration’s Middle East policies as a way to illustrate the central tenets of his 
argument that Iran was the main problem in the region and that the United States 
was not doing enough to counter Iranian influence. “Iran is ascendant, [and] there is 
a Cold War atmosphere in the Gulf,” he said. 
The GCC “feels abandoned” by the U.S.-Iran “rapprochement.” GCC states feel that 
they are not true partners of the United States, but rather “junior partners.” (This 
phrase “junior partners” gained currency among many of the participants and 
continued to be used sarcastically and with air quotes during the remainder of the 
day’s discussion.) From the speaker’s perspective, the GCC is asked to be the “ATM 
for U.S. policies in the region” but has little input into the crafting of those policies. 
The persistence of such a view inside the Gulf has led to the belief that Gulf Arab 
contributions to U.S. efforts in the region are taken for granted and not adequately 
appreciated by Washington. There is a general dissatisfaction about the GCC’s 
relations with the United States, but the GCC still seeks closer ties, not a distancing. 
What the Gulf states would like is a partnership with the United States that more 
closely resembles the latter’s partnerships with Japan and South Korea. A closer and 
more equitable partnership would help facilitate more coherent and successful 
policies in the region, he suggested, and help pave the way for stronger regional 
defenses. In particular, he cited the GCC’s need for drones and precision strike 
ballistic missiles in order to help it counter Iran’s “ambition to become [a regional] 
hegemon.” 
A senior Saudi diplomatic scholar was the third speaker on the panel. His general 
thesis was that the United States does not understand the values and concerns of its 
GCC partners. “Does the U.S. recognize Arab needs?” he asked rhetorically. He 
pointed to current regional conflicts and argued that the only thing Arab states see is 
the suffering of Sunnis at the hands of Shiites and Iranian proxies. He said that this 
was causing outrage in the Gulf and implied that it was what was behind the influx of 
Sunni youth into the ranks of extremist groups like ISIS and Nusra Front. To begin to 
assuage this rising sense of indignation, the GCC decided to take action against the 
Houthis in Yemen. He saw the mission against the Houthis as an assertion of GCC 
unity, something the member states were “very proud” of. He called the fitna [i.e., 
conflict] between Sunni and Shia in the region to be the biggest threat to security and 
stability. Building on this point, and with the example of the Shiite-dominated 
government in Iraq as background, he suggested that democracy “can’t work in the 
region.” “We have our own traditions,” he said, implying that U.S. efforts to 





Panel 2: Discussion 
We began the discussion by posing a question about the rumored united Arab 
military force. Responses were mostly skeptical. No one was particularly bullish on 
the prospect and most thought that the initiative would not amount to much. The 
former Pentagon official who spoke on the second panel summed up the feeling that 
many in the room seemed to share: “It’s a good idea. I doubt it will work.” The 
American’s copanelist, the Kuwaiti political scientist, added that the GCC has not 
fully embraced the idea. “It’s an Egyptian-led project,” he said. “Cairo is more 
enthused about it than anyone else.” He continued to explain that its raison d’être 
was unclear. And that because current conflicts are being driven by nonstate actors, 
he was unsure how a conventional military alliance would be effective. “How can the 
united Arab force combat such a threat?” he asked rhetorically.  
A senior Qatari academic countered that the “only solution to ISIS” must come from 
a joint Sunni Arab military force. Along similar lines, a senior Kuwaiti academic said 
that the “Arab mindset” was such that there “must always be an [external] enemy.” 
First it was the Ottomans, then the Brits, then Zionism, and now [it’s] Iran.” However, 
he cautioned, the current woes in the region and Iran’s growing influence are not the 
fault of the United States. Rather, it was the “Arabs” who “failed to support post-
Saddam Iraq” and gave Iran the opportunity to exploit the power vacuum.  
These points were countered by a retired Emirati senior military official, who 
suggested that the United States was the key to the region’s problems and the only 
one that could effectively combat ISIS. Even so, he questioned U.S. commitment to 
the war against ISIS and asked whether Washington was even “serious about 
combating ISIS.” This comment was a return to the main grievance shared by many 
regional participants in the room, which was a general dissatisfaction with U.S. policy 
and a feeling that the GCC was being asked to back U.S. efforts in the region without 
having a say in what those efforts were. As a senior Saudi journalist added, Saudi 
Arabia has come to the conclusion that it can no longer be “the gas station or 
bankrollers” for U.S. policy. Instead, the new Saudi monarch, King Salman, and other 
GCC leaders feel that they need to be in charge of determining their own self-
interests. In other words, Saudi Arabia no longer feels that it can rely on Washington 
to secure its interests in the region. Instead, Saudi Arabia feels that it must take the 
lead in pursing more assertive regional policies than it has previously to counteract 





Panel 3: Strategic Deterrence and 
Nonproliferation in the Middle East: 
Future Outlook 
The third panel was designed to discuss the future of strategic deterrence in the 
Middle East. In particular, we asked the panelists to offer their thoughts on the 
question of proliferation and if they thought nonproliferation was possible for the 
region. While each panelist commented on the central topic, the regional panelists 
moved beyond that issue to explore the complex dynamics that will shape future 
regional security. They stressed that social and cultural problems in the Middle East 
would be greater determinants of future security than military dynamics or nuclear 
proliferation. 
A senior Saudi journalist was the panel’s first speaker. Unlike most of the 
participants, the speaker deemphasized the threat posed by Iran. He considered it 
exaggerated and a distraction from the real issues affecting his country and the 
region more broadly. He implied that the Iranian and Shiite threats were 
overemphasized by regional governments to distract their people from growing 
social and economic inequities. In his view, “strategic problems will be made worse 
over time due to cultural and social problems.” He pointed to rising unemployment, 
population growth, a youth bulge, regressive policies toward women, and the spread 
of extremism as the biggest issues facing the region.  
The speaker was less specific when it came to the issue of nuclear proliferation. He 
implied that some countries in the region might possibly want to match Iran’s 
nuclear program with their own, but overall, he thought this was the wrong way to 
look at regional security. He returned to a familiar issue—perceptions of inequality in 
U.S.-GCC relations. He argued that this relationship must be one of equals and cannot 
be perceived as a “master-servant” relationship. If the GCC were to feel that 
Washington took its concerns seriously and considered it an equal, then U.S. policy 
concerns could gain more traction in the region. This, he suggested, was the best 
approach the United States could take to help prevent nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East.  
The second presentation was given by an American nuclear proliferation expert. The 





limits of proliferation in most Middle East countries. Some countries, such as Kuwait 
and Bahrain, are simply too small to house adequate nuclear programs. Others, such 
as Oman, lack the desire to do so. Ultimately, he thought the only states in which 
nuclear programs may be viable are the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Jordan 
is considered an outlier due to the discovery of uranium deposits in the country. 
However, he also considered certain constraints that could prevent these countries 
from going nuclear. Political considerations in Egypt, Turkey’s membership in NATO, 
and the UAE’s 1-2-3 nuclear agreement with the United States (wherein it promises 
not to enrich uranium or process spent plutonium from its reactors in exchange for 
civilian nuclear assistance) all make proliferation in these countries unlikely but not 
impossible.  
Saudi Arabia, however, was the “real wild card” from his perspective. Saudi Arabia 
has the size, political power, and wealth to make a complex nuclear enrichment 
program viable. Its rivalry with Iran, which has grown increasingly over the last 
decade, might serve as suitable motivation for pursuing a nuclear deterrent that 
matches whatever Iran is believed to posses down the road. The quest for parity with 
Iran—both in terms of regional influence and military power—could propel Riyadh to 
develop or obtain a nuclear weapons capacity. A rumor that is almost accepted as 
fact by some in the region is that Saudi Arabia has already purchased either nuclear 
weapons or has access to nuclear weapons (should the need arise) from Pakistan. 
This is not how proliferation generally works, he added, but it can’t be ruled out as a 
possibility either.  
The day’s final speaker was a senior Turkish academic and university department 
head. She agreed with the panel’s first speaker that most of the region’s problems 
exist below the strategic level. For her the issues that will continue to put the most 
pressure on regional governments are social, cultural, and economic. The problems 
affecting youth (unemployment, limited civil society, and extremism) will 
increasingly impact the security of states. She suggested that the current conflicts in 
the region are ultimately rooted in these social and cultural ills—problems that, if 
not solved, will continue to plague the region and fuel its violence. 
The speaker then turned to her own country, Turkey, and commented on its views on 
nuclear proliferation. She affirmed that the NATO partnership will remain the 
bedrock of Turkey’s strategic policy in the future. However, she argued that NATO’s 
nuclear shield is no longer considered vital to Ankara because Turkey no longer 
views foreign powers, such as Russia, as a threat to its security. Rather, the most 
serious threats to Turkey are seen as coming from “lower-level, asymmetrical 
enemies.” Nonstate actors (loosely defined) are increasingly considered by Ankara to 
be the biggest source of domestic and regional instability. Turkey believes this trend 
will continue, especially if the conflict in Syria is allowed to churn along and Asad 





Panel 3: Discussion 
After the third panel, we opened up the floor for closing comments. Many 
participants took this opportunity to restate points that they had made earlier in the 
day. Others saw it as the last chance to remind their American hosts of the many 
failures of U.S. policy. Overall, the comments expressed during this concluding 
discussion can be divided into three broad themes: the U.S. future role in the region; 
the failures of American policy; and sectarianism. 
Views on America’s future role in the region were mixed. Some regional participants 
questioned whether doubts about Washington’s commitment to the region were 
misplaced. Others argued that the United States’ own self-declared pivot-to-Asia was 
fanciful and would not change the U.S. role in the region. As a senior Emirati 
academic argued, even if the U.S. military presence in Asia grows, it will not leave the 
Gulf. That is because the United States sees itself as the “stabilizer of the [world’s] oil 
market” and would not risk leaving that job to someone else. After all, he concluded, 
Washington’s Asian allies need oil too. 
Blame was placed on the United States for just about everything wrong in the Middle 
East. The majority of regional participants presented their criticism from generally 
one of two angles: a) America’s interventions have caused the region’s problems; or 
b) America’s lack of intervention has caused the region’s problems. Many regional 
participants argued both points. A Kuwaiti scholar argued that Iran’s power had 
grown because the United States failed to counter it, which in turn caused extremism 
among Sunnis to increase. Similarly, a senior Saudi academic said that the United 
States is still “the international police” and should be doing more for peace in the 
region. A former GCC official from Oman added that the United States needed to lead 
a development plan for the Middle East. In his view the problems in the region are 
rooted in social and cultural causes and only a dramatic development mission “like 
the Marshall Plan” can address those issues.  
Finally, several participants commented on the issue of sectarianism. Many agreed 
that sectarianism is a major threat to the region, and all but three participants (an 
Omani official, a Saudi journalist, and a Kuwaiti academic) thought that the policies 
of Middle East states had any role in the rise of sectarianism. Rather, the majority of 
regional participants put the blame squarely on the United States and Iran for the 
problem of sectarianism. As a retired senior Emirati military official argued bluntly, 
Paul Bremer was ultimately the source of the problem for his role in sidelining 
Sunnis in post-Saddam Iraq. The Emirati continued that sectarianism began only with 
the creation of Iraq’s democratic constitution, which allowed the Shiites to enter 
power based on their demographic advantage. The solution proposed by the Emirati, 
without a hint of sarcasm, was that “the U.S. should change the Iraqi constitution.” 





Washington could “just change the Iraqi constitution, unilaterally, whenever it 





Conclusion and Key Takeaways 
Strategic dynamics in the Middle East are in the midst of severe disruption. It is 
unclear what the political and power structures of the region will be when the dust 
finally settles. Gulf Arab states view current instability through absolutist 
perspectives. Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and Washington’s acquiescence to those 
ambitions is at the root of every problem in the region. While the Gulf Arab states 
worry about Iran and complain about U.S. policies, their reliance on U.S.-provided 
deterrence continues to grow. However, their trust in the United States and in its 
commitment to deter Iran is waning. There is therefore a tension between what the 
Gulf states want the United States’ role in the region to be and what they believe it is 
or will be in the future.  
The GCC’s mistrust inherently makes providing assurance more difficult for the 
United States. It might also complicate or diminish the United States’ effectiveness in 
stemming nuclear proliferation in the region should Arab states determine that they 
require nuclear capabilities to effectively deter an ascendant Iran. These topics were 
at the heart of the strategic dialogue event. Below we discuss the major themes from 
the day’s discussion that have strategic implications for the United States. These 
themes represent the views of regional participants and our perspective on those 
views. Taken together, they comprise the takeaways we deem most important for U.S. 
officials to consider regarding Gulf relations. They also serve as our concluding 
thoughts on the event.   
 Increasing mistrust is fundamentally changing GCC perceptions of the 
United States. U.S. Middle East policy is unpopular with Gulf Arab states. 
Washington’s refusal to topple the Asad regime, its alliance with the Shiite-
dominated Iraqi government in the war against ISIS, and the ongoing nuclear 
negotiations with Iran have particularly eroded confidence in the U.S. role in 
the region. As a result, mistrust is increasing in Gulf Arab capitals regarding 
U.S. policies and the intentions behind them. Gulf leaders are skeptical about 
U.S. commitments to the region and see many current policies as antithetical 
to their interests. 
 A nuclear deal with Iran could worsen U.S.-GCC relations. There is a deep 
cynicism in most GCC states (Oman is the lone exception) regarding the 
wisdom and viability of reaching a deal on Iran’s nuclear program. Despite 





2015 Camp David Summit, the prevailing view in the GCC is that a deal will 
not be effective at curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Instead, they see it as 
something that will further insulate the Iranian regime and put it on the road 
to developing a nuclear weapons capability. They further fear that once a 
deal has been signed, it will open the door for a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, 
which in turn will lead to Washington placing more favor on Iranian interests 
than on those of Arab states. For this reason, they see the United States’ 
pursuit of a deal as both naïve and something almost akin to a betrayal of its 
GCC allies. It is therefore likely that reaching a deal will have a negative 
impact on U.S.-Gulf relations.  
 Gulf Arab states might seek “parity” with Iran after a deal. A consistent 
theme in the dialogue was that Gulf Arab states aspire to reach parity with 
Iran. This theme was most strongly advocated by the Saudi, Emirati, and 
Kuwaiti delegates. It was heavily implied through our discussions that the 
GCC feels it cannot currently effectively compete with Iran in three areas: 
regional influence (e.g., having a strong and effective proxy network), ballistic 
missile capabilities, and the nuclear arena. Iran’s superiority in these areas is 
a problem for the Gulf states—and one they want to solve through 
establishing actual or effective parity with Iranian capabilities. The pursuit of 
parity, in their perspective, is necessary to counter Iranian regional influence 
and negate its ability to use coercive tactics as leverage in regional affairs.  
 Though a potential component of reaching parity with Iran, nuclear 
proliferation among GCC states might still be unlikely. Although the term 
parity suggests that GCC states want to develop a nuclear weapons program 
in response to Iran (or something approximate—if not superior—to what they 
perceive to be Iran’s nuclear capabilities), the majority lacks the capacity and 
will to do so. Most GCC states are either incapable or unwilling to pursue a 
nuclear program. Less predictable are Saudi Arabia and UAE. Though the UAE 
has the size, defense interests, and nascent capabilities to make a nuclear 
enrichment program viable, it also has a 1-2-3 nuclear agreement with the 
United States that severely limits what its nuclear program can be. To 
advance its program along the lines of Iran’s, the UAE would have to walk 
away from the 1-2-3 agreement, which could damage its ties to Washington 
and undermine its reputation in the international community. At present 
there is no clear sign that it would be willing to take those risks in response 
to an Iran deal.  
 Saudi Arabia remains the “wild card” for nuclear proliferation in the Gulf. 
Saudi Arabia is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT). It also possesses a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, even despite 





murky.  That is because Riyadh’s current calculations on whether to pursue a 
nuclear enrichment program with potential military dimensions (or procure 
access to nuclear weapons from Pakistan) appear to be linked to its 
perception of the Iranian threat—particularly if Iran were to ratify a nuclear 
deal with the P5+1. If Iran’s influence via clients in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen 
continues to grow in the midterm, and if Saudi Arabia feels that it both lacks 
the capabilities to counter that influence and perceives the United States as 
equally incapable or unwilling to do so, then it might pursue policies such as 
a nuclear program as a matter of deterrence. If Iran cannot be marginalized 
through sanctions or international pressure, then Saudi Arabia might be 
inclined to pursue a policy of bi-polarity in regional power politics, with it 
and Iran as the two centers of gravity. Either way, if the trend of Iran’s 
growing influence continues, Saudi Arabia will have to make strategic choices 
on how to counter Iranian influence. In the GCC’s joint military operations 
against the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi’s new monarch, King Salman, has proved 
to be more assertive of Saudi’s interests than his predecessor. The belief 
among regional participants was that such forward-leaning policies would 
continue and that Saudi Arabia will begin to take on a more active role in 
directly countering Iranian proxies and regional influence. Establishing a 
nuclear enrichment program parallel to the Iranian program is one way that 
regional participants felt Saudi Arabia might decide to do that. 
 No foreign power can replace the United States as the security guarantor 
of the Persian Gulf and GCC states know this. U.S.-provided assurance 
remains central to GCC deterrence efforts and could remain key to 
preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the near bottomless list of 
complaints levied against U.S. policies by the regional participants, it was 
clear that they saw no alternative to the United States remaining the security 
guarantor for the Gulf, nor did they desire an alternative. Participants did not 
take seriously comments suggesting France, India, or China as a potential 
future replacement for the United States in the Gulf. What did become a 
focus, however, were the steps that the United States could take to improve 
relations and assurance efforts, particularly in response to a deal.  
 GCC states desire closer relations with the United States, access to more 
advanced ballistic missile technology, and the ability to develop 
indigenous defense capabilities. For the regional participants, the 
fundamental divide between Gulf Arab states and Washington was a lack of 
trust. They saw this in (what they perceived to be) the limits imposed by 
Washington on their defense programs. Such limits—such as those stemming 
from the INF treaty—prevented GCC states from developing adequate 
ballistic missile defense systems capable of deterring Iran’s robust ballistic 
missile program. They further wanted a fundamental change in defense 





develop their own defense capabilities and not simply provide access to 
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